The Case Number Was Never Called Again
On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Verified Declaration of Facts, Appointment of Trustee/Fiduciary, and Directive to the Appointed Fiduciary (Docket #252) — formally expressing the constructive trust and establishing the legal framework under which the proceedings were being challenged. After this filing, the case number 2023-MM-001669A was never again formally called in any hearing.
This is not an isolated procedural irregularity. It is a consistent, unbroken pattern across every subsequent judge, every subsequent courtroom, and every subsequent hearing in this case. Instead of calling the case number, proceedings were opened by docket number, or simply not called at all. The pattern holds across Dekleva, Buie, Crawford, Krause — and into the Teams-format hearings where the case was simply commenced without any formal call.
Why this matters: In Florida criminal procedure, formally calling the case number on the record is the mechanism by which the court establishes jurisdiction over that specific matter for that proceeding. Proceeding by docket number — or not calling the case at all — avoids engaging with the jurisdictional challenge on the record. After Plaintiff expressed the trust and began challenging the court's jurisdiction at every hearing, the case number disappeared from the record entirely. This is not coincidence. It is a pattern.
Judge Goerner Finds No Probable Cause — Case Proceeds Anyway
At the very first judicial appearance in the underlying criminal matter, Judge Donna M. Goerner — a Writ recipient documented on this site — formally checks "Did Not Find Probable Cause" on the official first appearance form and notes "Insufficient Information." The form is signed by Goerner, certified by Grant Maloy as Clerk of the Circuit Court, and filed May 6, 2023.
Despite making this determination, Goerner schedules an arraignment before Judge Dekleva on May 31, 2023. The case does not end. It continues through Dekleva, Crawford, Chase, the warrant attempt at Plaintiff's home, the circuit court civil challenge, and ultimately the federal lawsuit — all originating from a matter a judge found lacked probable cause on day one. State Doc. 7 · Filed 05/06/23
State Files Criminal Case Against Plaintiff
The State of Florida initiates a criminal case in Seminole County Court against Shad Douglas Pantle. This is the underlying proceeding from which all subsequent events arise. Judge James Dekleva presides as county court judge. Plaintiff proceeds pro se.
Accused Files Motion to Dismiss — Deputy Knight Has No Surety Bond
Pantle files an Amended Motion to Dismiss with prejudice under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190, arguing that Seminole County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Knight lacked the surety bond mandated by Fla. Stat. § 30.09(1)(a) & (b) and therefore held no lawful authority to make any arrest. Two independent public-record confirmations are placed before the court:
May 31, 2023 — Clerk of Court (phone): No record of any surety bond or other bond for Deputy Knight exists on file with the Seminole County Circuit Court.
August 18, 2023 — Public Records Request R000921-081823 (SCSO Records Section): Written response confirms: "The Seminole County Sheriff's Office does not have surety bonds. It provides liability insurance which covers all SCSO employees." Liability insurance is a two-party contract; a surety bond is a three-party instrument. They are not legally equivalent. The Sheriff's own office confirmed non-compliance in writing.
The motion further argued that without a valid bond, Knight was acting ultra vires under color of law only, making all evidence derived from his actions fruit of the poison tree, ab initio. Because Fla. Stat. § 843.02 (Resisting an Officer Without Violence) requires the officer be "legally authorized to execute process," the charge could not be sustained as a matter of law. Filing #184996740 · 10/29/23
Knight does hold a departmental oath of office — an internal SCSO document signed by Sheriff Dennis M. Lemma on June 7, 2017, sworn before a notary. It is not a certified Secretary of State filing and does not satisfy the constitutional oath requirement under Art. II §5(b) or 1 Stat. 23. Critically, the SCSO public records response confirms the no-bond deficiency applies to every deputy and to Sheriff Lemma himself — the Sheriff who signed Knight's appointment is himself unbonded under the same statute.
📄 Motion to Dismiss — Lack of Bond (Filing #184996740) 📄 Knight Oath & SCSO No-Bond Response 📄 SCSO No-Bond Evidence (Exhibit A)
Dekleva Denies All Three Motions — Declares Bond Requirement "No Longer Relevant"
At a hearing in Courtroom 4D, Judge James J. Dekleva denies three motions in sequence: the Motion to Suppress (ruling the officer "bonded" — directly contradicting the Sheriff's own written records), the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Bond, and the motion regarding Deputy Knight's Oath of Office. All three denials are entered on the official hearing minutes filed the same day.
In his oral ruling on the bond motion, Judge Dekleva states from the bench that Florida's deputy bond requirement under § 30.09 "it's not relevant" — a judicial declaration that overrides the unambiguous text of a state statute, made without any statutory exception applicable to the facts of this case. The hearing was digitally recorded (Tape: Digital 4D).
Dekleva's ruling created a judicial exemption with no basis in the statute: citizens are held to the letter of Florida law while the officers who enforce that law against them are exempted from its requirements by judicial decree. This asymmetry flows directly into the federal constitutional claims:
- Fla. Stat. § 30.09 — No valid bond = no lawful authority to perform deputy duties
- Fourth Amendment / Art. I § 12 Fla. Const. — Arrest by officer without lawful authority = unreasonable seizure
- 18 U.S.C. § 242 — Deprivation of rights under color of law by an officer whose authority was not lawfully constituted
- Equal Protection — Public held to strict statutory compliance; officials judicially exempted from the same statutes they enforce
📄 Hearing Minutes — All Three Denials (Docket #237) 🎥 Video: Dekleva Oral Ruling — Bond Motion Hearing
Docket Review Hearing — Three Attempts to Address Jurisdiction — Dekleva Re-Appoints Absent Backup Counsel Fletcher — Plaintiff Walks Out
A Docket Review Hearing opens at 8:56 AM in Courtroom 4D before Judge James J. Dekleva. Court Reporter: Digital 4D. State Attorneys Melissa Barker and Richard Coln are present. Kyle Fletcher is not present. The hearing minutes confirm this explicitly: "DEFENSE ATTORNEY FLETCHER, HUBERT K JR WAS NOT PRESENT." The hearing is on video. Docket #258 · 01/22/24
Fletcher's status at this point: Fletcher was assigned only as backup counsel — never retained, never consented to as defense counsel. By January 22 he had already been terminated multiple times. A Notice of Termination of All Public Defender's Office Services was filed on the docket on October 3, 2023 (Docket #189), terminating public defender services retroactive to June 29, 2023. A Notice of Termination of All Public and Private Attorney Services was e-filed October 29, 2023 (Docket #210, Filing #184998374), explicitly naming Fletcher and terminating his services retroactive to May 5, 2023, stating: "No further counsel will be accepted for the named defendant." Fletcher had also been terminated verbally on the record at prior hearings. He had never met Plaintiff in person outside a courtroom.
Plaintiff had filed a Notice and Demand for Proof of Jurisdiction on January 8, 2024 (Docket #257) — a 14-page document challenging the court's jurisdiction and demanding the matter be addressed on the record. At this January 22 hearing, Plaintiff raises the unaddressed jurisdiction demand. Dekleva does not address it. Plaintiff raises it a second time. Dekleva does not address it. Plaintiff raises it a third time — informing Dekleva that failing to address the jurisdiction demand constitutes contempt of the Supreme Court. Dekleva does not address it.
At that point Plaintiff states that until the Plaintiff proves in writing on the docket that the court has jurisdiction, he has nothing further to say. It is at this moment — and only at this moment — that Dekleva orders Fletcher appointed as counsel. Fletcher is not in the courtroom. Dekleva appoints, as backup counsel, an absent attorney who has been terminated multiple times by written notice on the docket — to represent a defendant who has just told the court he is done speaking until the jurisdiction question is answered. Dekleva then schedules another hearing. Plaintiff walks out. The entire sequence is on video. Docket #258 · 01/22/24
Later the same morning at 11:56 AM — after the hearing has ended — Fletcher files a Motion for Expert for Competency Evaluation (Docket #259, Filing #190219945) without having been present in court, without Plaintiff's consent, and without having ever met Plaintiff in person outside a courtroom. The motion argues Plaintiff is not mentally competent to proceed, citing Plaintiff's pro se filings as evidence of mental illness. Fletcher files this motion against Plaintiff's interests on the same day he was re-appointed in absentia as backup counsel — in a case where his termination had been on the docket since October 2023. Docket #259 · Filed 01/22/24 at 11:56 AM
Forcing counsel on a defendant who has invoked his right to proceed pro se implicates the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). A court may not compel representation by counsel over a knowing and voluntary waiver. Dekleva's order requiring Fletcher's presence — by a judge who had already been found to have denied the bond motion without statutory authority — is documented on video. Video · Jan. 22, 2024 · Preserved — Upload Pending
This hearing occurs three days before Plaintiff files the civil lawsuit challenging Dekleva's authority on January 25, 2024. Dekleva is presiding over the criminal matter at the same time a constitutional challenge to his authority to preside over anything is being prepared. The forced appointment of Fletcher — an attorney Plaintiff had not retained — ensures a third party is inserted between Plaintiff and the court at precisely this moment.
Fletcher Files Identical Competency Motion a Second Time — Certificate of Service Backdated to January 22
Two days after filing the first competency motion (Docket #259, Filing #190219945, 01/22/2024 at 11:56 AM), Fletcher files an identical second competency motion (Docket #267, Filing #190454095, e-filed 01/24/2024 at 2:39 PM). The two documents are word for word the same — same four grounds, same rule citations (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b) and 3.211), same argument that Plaintiff's pro se filings indicate mental illness and that Plaintiff does not have a realistic grasp of the evidence against him.
Primary source confirmed June 1, 2026. The motion itself names the defendant as "SHAD PANTEL" — the same misspelling appearing in every Fletcher filing from October 18, 2023 onward. This is not a clerical error isolated to one document; it is a pattern confirmed across multiple primary source filings now in hand.
The four stated grounds in the motion are now documented by primary source:
- Reasonable grounds to believe defendant is not mentally competent to proceed
- Pro se filings indicate mental illness; defendant does not have "a realistic grasp of what is going on in his case regarding the evidence against him"
- Undersigned has concerns defendant may have mental health issues based on "representations and statements made by the Defendant to the undersigned"
- Defendant "is indigent for cost and was appointed a public defender at first"
Ground 3 is particularly notable: Fletcher claims his concerns are based on "representations and statements" Pantle made to him — yet per the documented record, their only substantive communication was a 15-minute phone call on October 24, 2023, which ended with Fletcher hanging up. Fletcher never met Pantle in person outside a courtroom. Ground 4 is a judicial admission that Fletcher's status derived from a public defender appointment — not retained counsel.
The certificate of service on the second filing — now confirmed by primary source image — states it was hand delivered to the State Attorney's Office on January 22nd, 2024 — the date of the original filing, two days before this motion was e-filed. The second motion is not an amended motion. There are no changes. It is the same document submitted twice, with a certificate of service referencing a date that predates the e-filing by two days.
Fletcher was re-appointed as backup counsel in absentia on January 22 — without Plaintiff's consent, over Plaintiff's objection, despite written termination notices on the docket since October 2023. Within hours he filed a motion to have Plaintiff declared mentally incompetent — without ever having met Plaintiff in person. Two days later he filed the same motion again with a backdated certificate of service. The motion names the defendant as "SHAD PANTEL" — not the defendant's actual name. Fletcher had no retained authority, had never met Plaintiff outside a courtroom, and was acting against the explicit instructions of the person he was purporting to represent.
Docket #259 · Filing #190219945 · 01/22/24 · 11:56 AM Docket #267 · Filing #190454095 · 01/24/24 · 2:39 PM
Plaintiff Files Civil Suit Against Dekleva in Circuit Court
Pantle files a civil action in Seminole County Circuit Court challenging Dekleva's authority on oath deficiency grounds. Judge Michael Joseph Rudisill — already documented on this site with his certified oath — is the first assigned circuit court judge. This is the original complaint. An Amended Complaint adding Carsandra Buie as a second named defendant will be filed February 27, 2024 — fourteen days after Buie presides over the criminal matter, refuses to produce her oath, and makes ex parte contact with fired counsel.
Judge Rudisill Recuses — The Morning After Filing — Citing "The Identity of the Parties"
Less than 24 hours after the complaint is filed, Judge Rudisill signs and e-files his Order of Recusal at 10:21 AM on January 26, 2024. His stated reason is precise and notable. He does not cite a conflict of interest, a personal relationship, or any procedural rule. He writes only:
The identity of the parties. Not a conflict. Not a relationship. The case was a constitutional oath challenge filed against a sitting judge. Rudisill read who was suing whom and stepped away the next morning. He refers the case to the Chief/Administrative Judge for reassignment.
Plaintiff Files Notice of Conflict of Interest — Demands Dekleva Recuse Immediately
Two days after filing the civil lawsuit against Dekleva, Plaintiff files a Notice of Conflict of Interest in the criminal case (Filing #190675700, e-filed 01/27/2024 at 3:45 PM). The notice states that on January 25, 2024, complaint case number 59-2024-CA-000138 was filed in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit against James J. DeKleva. It formally notifies the criminal court that a conflict of interest exists between Pantle and Dekleva and demands that Dekleva immediately recuse himself from the instant case. Dekleva does not recuse. He continues to preside. Docket #268 · Filing #190675700 · 01/27/24
Jury Selection — Fletcher Present — Motion to Continue Granted — Plaintiff Attempts to Serve Dekleva — Deputy Refuses — Fletcher Confiscates Document
Jury Selection opens at 8:55 AM in Courtroom 4D before Judge Dekleva. State Attorneys Melissa Barker and Richard Koln are present. Defense Attorney Hubert Kyle Fletcher Jr. is present — this is the hearing at which Fletcher appears, not January 22. The court grants the defense motion to continue. Pre-trial conference is continued to March 6, 2024. The minutes record: "Defendant is to have a competency evaluation before the next court date" — linking to the competency motion Fletcher had filed without Plaintiff's consent on January 22. Docket #269 · 01/29/24
The civil lawsuit (Pantle v. Dekleva et al., Case No. 59-2024-CA-000138) had been filed four days earlier on January 25, 2024. At this hearing Plaintiff brings a copy of the lawsuit into the courtroom and attempts to hand it to the deputy sheriff present. The deputy refuses to accept it. Plaintiff places the lawsuit on the podium. Fletcher — present at the hearing without retained authority — picks up the document from the podium and confiscates it, actively working to prevent the civil lawsuit from proceeding. The entire sequence is on video.
The document Fletcher took from the podium was a civil lawsuit naming Dekleva as a defendant — filed by the same plaintiff standing in Dekleva's courtroom. Both the refusal and the confiscation occur in open court, in front of the judge the lawsuit names.
The Seminole County Sheriff's Office Civil Division received the summons (to be served upon Dekleva) on January 26, 2024 at 8:13 AM — the same morning Rudisill filed his recusal in the circuit court civil case. Service was executed on January 29, 2024 at 2:08 PM by Deputy Sheriff/Civil Process Officer Dawn Causseaux, on Dayna Griffin, Court Operations Manager, at the Criminal Justice Center, 101 Eslinger Way — under Sheriff Dennis M. Lemma. (Docket Doc. 6 · Filing #190901630 · E-Filed 01/31/2024). Dekleva therefore had actual notice at the morning hearing, witnessed the deputy refuse and Fletcher confiscate the lawsuit, and was formally served at his courthouse that same afternoon.
- Deputy refuses to accept the lawsuit — a court officer present in the courtroom declines to receive a civil complaint from the party standing before the judge named in that complaint
- Fletcher confiscates the document — picks it up from the podium and actively works to suppress the civil lawsuit from proceeding. An attorney with no retained authority, forced on Plaintiff over objection, removing a legal document from a courtroom podium is on video
- Actual notice before formal service — Dekleva presided over the hearing at which his own lawsuit was physically present, refused by his deputy, and confiscated by his forced appointee. He was formally served by the Sheriff that same afternoon
- No recusal in the criminal case — Dekleva never recused himself from the criminal matter despite being a named defendant in a lawsuit brought by the party before him, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330 notwithstanding
- Fletcher's function is documented — Fletcher filed a competency motion against Plaintiff's interests on January 22 without being present at the hearing. On January 29 he appears in court, participates in the continuance, and removes the civil lawsuit from the courtroom podium. The sequence is on video
Video · Jan. 29, 2024 · Preserved — Upload Pending State Case No. 2023-MM-001669A · Civil Case No. 59-2024-CA-000138
Dekleva Signs Competency Order — Appoints Psychological Affiliates — One Day Before His Own Recusal
On January 30, 2024, Judge Dekleva signs and files an Order Appointing Expert(s) for Competency Evaluation (Filing #190803954, e-filed 01/30/2024 at 9:44 AM). The order appoints Psychological Affiliates, Inc., 2737 West Fairbanks Ave., Winter Park, FL 32789 to examine Plaintiff pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.211(a) and Fla. Stat. § 916.12. The order states it comes before the court "based upon the Defendant's counsel's motion" — referencing the competency motion filed by Fletcher, the attorney appointed without consent to represent the defendant who challenged the court's jurisdiction and walked out. Docket #277 · Filing #190803954 · 01/30/24
The order directs the appointed expert to evaluate whether Plaintiff has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel, whether he has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings, and whether he is competent to proceed to trial. Psychological Affiliates, Inc. is named as the sole evaluator.
Jan. 22: Plaintiff challenges jurisdiction three times. Dekleva appoints absent Fletcher. Plaintiff walks out.
Jan. 22: Fletcher files competency motion #1 — same morning — without consent.
Jan. 24: Fletcher files identical competency motion #2 — backdated certificate of service.
Jan. 29: Jury selection. Minutes note competency evaluation ordered before next court date.
Jan. 30: Dekleva signs the competency order naming Psychological Affiliates — one day before his own recusal.
Jan. 31: Dekleva recuses from the criminal case.
Dekleva exits the case having used his own forced appointee's motion to order a mental evaluation of the defendant who challenged his jurisdiction. The order names the same evaluator — Psychological Affiliates — that Buie later references in her February 13 ex parte communications with Fletcher.
Dekleva Recuses from Criminal Case — Six Days After Being Sued — Never Recused While Active Civil Defendant
On January 31, 2024, Judge James J. Dekleva files an Order of Recusal from the criminal case (Filing #190920051, e-filed 01/31/2024 at 11:07 AM). The order states: "The Administrative Judge is requested to appoint a Judge to preside over any further proceedings." Signed in chambers, Wednesday January 31, 2024. The case is subsequently reassigned to Judge Carsandra Buie. Docket #279 · Filing #190920051 · 01/31/24
The timeline of Dekleva's non-recusal is now complete: the civil lawsuit naming him was filed January 25. The Notice of Conflict of Interest demanding his recusal was filed January 27. He presided over the January 29 jury selection hearing — as a named civil defendant, with his own lawsuit physically present in his courtroom, confiscated by his appointee. He recused on January 31 — six days after being sued, two days after the jury selection hearing. He never recused while actively presiding as a named defendant.
Fletcher Texts Pantle — Cease-and-Desist #1 Issued — Same Day as Dekleva Recusal
At 12:23 PM on January 31, 2024 — the same day Dekleva files his recusal — Fletcher sends Pantle two text messages: (1) "Please send me your email address so that I can make sure you are apprised of what is going on with your case" and (2) "Judge Dekleva recused himself." Primary source confirmed: screenshot in hand.
Fletcher's claim that he does not have Pantle's email is directly contradicted by the court record: Pantle's email, phone number, and mailing address had been in the Florida e-file system in the case since June 2023 (affidavit paragraph 9). Fletcher was active on that case docket. The claim of not knowing the email address is not credible on its face.
At 12:26 PM — three minutes later — Pantle responds with the first written cease-and-desist by text message: "Do not text me again. Do not call me again. Any correspondence needs to be done via the US Postal system. You have my mailing address which is clearly indicated in docket 230 of which you are now a Trustee."
Jan. 31, 12:23 PM — Fletcher texts asking for email. Claims not to know it. ← Screenshot confirmed
Jan. 31, 12:26 PM — Pantle: cease-and-desist #1 by text. US Mail only. ← Screenshot confirmed
Feb. 9, 2024 — Docket #282: formal written termination sent certified + regular mail. ← Signed PDF + envelope confirmed
Feb. 13, 12:32 PM — Fletcher texts Psychological Affiliates appointment. Violation of C&D #1.
Feb. 13, 1:41 PM — Pantle: cease-and-desist #2 by text. ← Screenshot confirmed
Feb. 13 — Green card confirms Fletcher received Docket #282 termination same day.
Feb. 14 — Fletcher mails 5-page Psychological Affiliates email exchange to home. Violation of C&D #2.
The "docket 230" reference in Pantle's text is legally precise — it is the filed notice in the criminal case containing Pantle's mailing address, and by designating Fletcher as "Trustee" of that docket, Pantle is applying the constructive trust framework consistently throughout, not informally. Fletcher was on notice by text, by certified mail, by regular mail, by docket filing, and verbally on the record — at every available channel — that his authority had been revoked.
Buie Presides While a Named Civil Defendant — Refuses Oath Demand — Reassigns Fletcher — Grants Speedy Trial Waiver — Schedules April 9
Pre-trial conference opens at 09:24 AM in Courtroom 4C, CD LOG 1007 TAPE. Primary source confirmed: Docket #284 official court minutes in hand. Present: County Judge Carsandra Buie; Deputy Clerk D. Christian; State Attorneys Richard Parker and Lynnette Paolucci; Defense Attorney Fletcher, Hubert K Jr; Deputy Sheriff/Bailiff D. Stewart. Court Reporter: Digital 4C. Charges on the record: Unlawful Speed (Citation AHM5KQE) and Resisting an Officer Without Violence. Buie has been a named defendant in the civil lawsuit (Pantle v. Dekleva et al., Case No. 59-2024-CA-000138) for 19 days. She is presiding — not merely administering — over a criminal case brought by the same plaintiff who sued her.
Fletcher is listed on the official minutes as "Defense Attorney" — on the same day Pantle received the green card (PS Form 3811) confirming Fletcher's personal receipt of the February 9 termination notice (Docket #282). The court record lists him as defense counsel. The termination record confirms he was not. Both documents are dated February 13, 2024.
Attorney Kyle Fletcher appears — again — as backup counsel. Fletcher had never been retained as defense counsel. He had been terminated by written notice on the docket in October 2023 and verbally on the record at multiple prior hearings. Plaintiff fires Fletcher again on the record at this hearing. Plaintiff then demands that Judge Buie produce her oath of office compliant with 1 Stat. 23. Buie refuses.
Buie then takes multiple actions from the bench: she engages in ex parte communications with Fletcher in an attempt to enter an order compelling Plaintiff to undergo a mental competency evaluation with Psychological Affiliates. She reassigns Kyle Fletcher to the case — reinstating the attorney Plaintiff had just fired, over Plaintiff's objections and against Supreme Court of the United States mandated case law (*Faretta v. California*). She grants the defense motion to continue with waiver of speedy trial — a motion Pantle did not consent to, brought by an attorney whose authority had been revoked. And she reschedules the hearing to April 9, 2024 at 09:30 AM before herself — which the official minutes confirm verbatim: "PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE CONTINUED TO 04/09/2024 AT 09:30 AM IN COURTROOM 4C... BEFORE JUDGE CARSANDRA BUIE." Every one of these acts is performed by a judge who is a named civil defendant in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff standing before her, without a 1 Stat. 23-compliant oath, having just refused to produce one on demand.
On the defendant's signature line, the minutes record: "Left without signing — Mailed." Pantle refused to acknowledge the proceedings by signature and left. The clerk noted it and mailed the document. This handwritten notation by the clerk is itself a primary source record of Pantle's documented departure.
- Buie presiding while a named defendant — 19 days after being sued by Plaintiff, Buie is on the bench in his criminal case. No recusal filed
- Docket number, not case number — matter called by docket number, a procedural irregularity
- Second oath refusal in the criminal case — Buie refuses on demand, joining Dekleva's implicit deficiency and preceding Krause's April 9 refusal. Three judges in the same case
- Ex parte communications with fired counsel — Buie engages with Fletcher outside Plaintiff's participation to attempt a mental competency order with Psychological Affiliates, a named facility
- Mental evaluation order attempted — a judge without a compliant oath, who is a named civil defendant, attempts to order a mental evaluation of the plaintiff who sued her, through ex parte contact with his fired attorney
- Buie reinstates fired counsel over Faretta objection — imposes Fletcher against Plaintiff's will and against controlling SCOTUS precedent
- Buie sets April 9 — the scheduling decision originates with a judge who is a named defendant in Plaintiff's lawsuit. Fourteen days later Plaintiff adds her to that lawsuit
→ Buie · Meet the Judges 📄 Docket #284 — Official Pre-Trial Conference Minutes · Feb. 13, 2024 📄 Amended Complaint — Buie Added (Filing #192868610)
Formal Written Termination of Fletcher Sent by Certified Mail — Four Days Before Fletcher's Feb 13 Appearance
On February 9, 2024, Plaintiff mails a formal Notice of Termination of Attorney of Record to Hubert Kyle Fletcher Jr., Esquire, Florida Bar #930628, 3743 Savannah Loop, Oviedo FL 32765 — sent via both Certified and Regular Mail. The notice states that Fletcher's services are terminated effective immediately, retroactively ab initio to the date he was first appointed. Primary source confirmed: original document in hand.
The grounds stated in the termination letter include: (1) breach of trust; (2) ineffective assistance; (3) "actual intentional harm and malice" — specifically the competency motion; and (4) Fletcher's close personal relationship with James DeKleva, characterized as a clear conflict of interest. The letter directs Fletcher to cease and desist all communications on Plaintiff's behalf with the court or any third party, warning that any further filings will constitute breach of trust, trespass, and grounds for civil litigation.
This is the third formal written termination of Fletcher — following Docket #189 (October 3, 2023) and Docket #210 (October 29, 2023) — and the fourth including verbal terminations on the record. This letter is filed as Docket #282 on the court record. Per the affidavit (paragraph 37), Plaintiff received the certified mail green card confirming Fletcher's receipt of this notice on February 13, 2024 — the same day Fletcher appeared before Buie without disclosing Plaintiff was present in the courtroom.
Fletcher received this certified termination notice on February 13, 2024 — the green card confirms it. On that same day, February 13, Fletcher entered Courtroom 4C before the hearing started, left and re-entered multiple times (believed to be ex parte communications), then spoke about Plaintiff before Judge Buie without disclosing Plaintiff was present. Fletcher acted as Plaintiff's attorney on February 13 despite: (a) having been terminated three times in writing, (b) having been terminated verbally on the record at multiple hearings, (c) receiving written confirmation of his latest termination in the mail that very morning. This sequence is now established by primary source documents on both ends.
Docket #282 · Filed Feb. 9, 2024 · Sent Certified & Regular Mail · Green Card Received Feb. 13, 2024
From: Altamonte Springs, FL 32714
Postage: $17.90
Tracking: 9589 0710 5270 0382 1612 59
Service: ☑ Adult Signature · ☑ Certified Mail®
To: Hubert Kyle Fletcher Junior
Florida Bar #930628
3743 Savannah Loop, Oviedo FL 32765
Postmark: February 12, 2024 — Orlando FL 328 · First-Class Mail · Permit No. G-10
Green card article number: 9590 9402 8707 3310 6297 01
Transfer tracking: 9589 0710 5270 0382 1612 59
The green card was received by Plaintiff on February 13, 2024 — the same day as the Courtroom 4C hearing. The postmark of February 12 is USPS processing date; delivery to Fletcher at 3743 Savannah Loop occurred before that. Fletcher's name on Section B confirms personal receipt. He did not appear before Buie without knowledge of his termination. He appeared with actual confirmed written notice of it — his third written termination, his fifth overall. The green card proving his receipt arrived in Pantle's hands the same morning. This is not a disputed fact. His name is on the green card.
📄 Docket #282 — Notice of Termination of Attorney of Record (Signed)
Buie Added to Civil Lawsuit — Amended Complaint Filed Under Penalty of Perjury
Fourteen days after the February 13 hearing, Plaintiff files a verified Amended Complaint (Filing #192868610, e-filed 02/27/2024 at 7:46 PM) in the circuit court civil case, adding Carsandra Buie as a named defendant alongside Dekleva. The amended complaint alleges six counts: Dekleva violates 1 Stat. 23; Dekleva impersonates a county court judge; Dekleva breaches the Express Trust; Buie violates 1 Stat. 23; Buie impersonates a county court judge; Buie breaches the Express Trust.
The jurisdictional statement is precise and deliberately framed: jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint is granted "ONLY to a Judge who has executed the Oath of Office mandated by Public Law 1 Stat. 23." The complaint attaches certified copies of both defendants' oaths — both on Art. II §5(b) form, neither 1 Stat. 23-compliant — certified by Secretary of State Cord Byrd. Damages sought: $72,000,000. The complaint is verified under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.115(e), signed under penalty of perjury, and notarized.
The complaint specifically documents, at ¶¶14–26, the January 22 and February 13 hearings — Dekleva's forced Fletcher appointment and denial of jurisdiction demand, and Buie's pre-trial conference, ex parte contact with Fletcher, refused oath demand, and attempted mental evaluation order. Certificate of service confirms a copy was sent to Dekleva by certified mail and e-filed to the State Attorney's office on the same date. Filing #192868610 · 02/27/2024 · Case No. 2024CA000138
Clerk Refuses to Issue Summons for Buie — Stamps "NOT ISSUED" on the Document
The day after the Amended Complaint is filed naming Buie as a defendant, the Seminole County Clerk of Court — Grant Maloy — refuses to issue the summons for Carsandra Buie. The summons document is stamped: "*SUMMONS NOT ISSUED* PER RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.190 ON AMENDED COMPLAINT." The summons names Buie at the Criminal Justice Center, 101 Eslinger Way — the same courthouse where she had presided over Plaintiff's criminal case fifteen days earlier. The refusal is a documented entry in the official civil docket as Doc. 10.
Buie is a sitting judge in the 18th Judicial Circuit — the same circuit whose clerk is refusing to issue her summons. Grant Maloy is the same Clerk of Court who certified Dekleva's and Buie's oaths of office and whose office is located at the same address. The refusal to issue a summons on a sitting judge of the same circuit, one day after she is named as a civil defendant, is the documented procedural act that prompted the Notice to Sue the Clerk filed the following day.
Plaintiff Files Notice of Intention to Sue the Clerk — Summons Is Never Issued
On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff files a Notice of Intention to Sue the Clerk of Court, addressed directly to Grant Maloy. The notice states that on February 28, 2024, the Clerk "willfully and unlawfully concealed, removed, mutilated, obliterated, falsified" the summons for Buie in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190. The notice gives the Clerk 48 hours to correct the violation and issue the summons.
The summons for Buie is never issued. The Amended Complaint nonetheless proceeds on the civil docket with Buie named as a defendant — without her ever being formally served. Six days after the Notice to Sue the Clerk is filed, Buie recuses herself from the criminal case. The civil case continues with Buie as a named unserved defendant through the White recusal, the Schwab assignment, and ultimately the Isenhower dismissal on October 4, 2024.
Grant Maloy is the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Seminole County. His office certified Dekleva's oaths of office. His office filed no minutes for the May 7, 2024 hearing at which Crawford failed to appear. His office refused to issue the summons for Buie the day after she was named as a defendant in a constitutional oath challenge. Each of these acts — or absences — is a documented entry in the official record of this case.
📄 Notice of Intention to Sue the Clerk (Docket Doc. 11) 📄 Amended Complaint — DeKleva & Buie
Buie Recuses From Criminal Case — Never Formally Served — Six Days After Notice to Sue the Clerk
On March 7, 2024 — six days after the Notice to Sue the Clerk is filed over the refused summons — Carsandra Buie recuses herself from the criminal case, Case No. 2023-MM-001669A. She was never formally served in the civil case. The summons the Clerk refused to issue on February 28 was never corrected. Buie recuses not in response to formal service, but in apparent response to being named as a defendant and the Clerk's refusal becoming a matter of documented record.
Jan. 25: Original civil lawsuit filed naming Buie — no recusal.
Feb. 13: Buie presides, refuses oath demand, ex parte contact with Fletcher, schedules April 9 — no recusal.
Feb. 27: Amended Complaint filed, Buie formally added as defendant.
Feb. 28: Clerk refuses to issue Buie's summons.
Mar. 1: Notice to Sue the Clerk filed — 18 U.S.C. § 2071 cited.
Mar. 7: Buie recuses — 41 days after original lawsuit, never formally served.
Buie's recusal from the criminal case does not undo the acts she took from the bench on February 13 while a named civil defendant — the oath refusal, the ex parte contact, the Fletcher reinstatement, the mental evaluation attempt, the April 9 scheduling. Those acts are in the record. The recusal arrives after them, not before.
Krause Sits for Crawford — Oath Demanded and Refused — Plaintiff Walks Out on the Record — Lemma's Expired Oath Obtained
Judge Debra L. Krause appears in Courtroom 4C — Carsandra Buie's courtroom, Buie's name still on the bench — sitting in for Crawford in a county court criminal matter. At this point the civil lawsuit Pantle v. Dekleva et al. (Case No. 59-2024-CA-000138) had been pending for 74 days. Dekleva, Buie, and others were already named defendants in a constitutional oath challenge. The criminal case nonetheless continues in the courtroom of a named civil defendant.
Attorney Kyle Fletcher appears. Fletcher had been assigned as backup counsel only and had been fired on the record on prior occasions. He had never met with Plaintiff in person outside a courtroom. Despite this, following the filing of the civil lawsuit, Fletcher filed two motions requesting that Plaintiff undergo a mental evaluation — motions filed by an attorney who had been repeatedly terminated, who had no personal knowledge of Plaintiff outside brief courtroom appearances, and whose motions functioned to burden and discredit a plaintiff who had filed suit against the presiding judges. Prior to the hearing, Fletcher conducts video surveillance inside the courtroom. Krause, Fletcher, and the prosecuting attorney are then observed by Plaintiff in open discussion in front of him — visibly attempting to determine how to apprehend him while he stands there.
Plaintiff fires Fletcher again on the record. Plaintiff then demands Judge Krause produce her oath of office compliant with 1 Stat. 23 — the First Act of Congress, Public Law, the constitutional standard. Krause does not produce it. As Plaintiff moves toward the exit, Krause issues a direct threat from the bench:
Plaintiff responds:
Krause continues without producing the oath. Plaintiff states for the record: "Let the record reflect that you are refusing to show your oath of office compliant with public law." Plaintiff walks out. Krause then proceeds with the hearing using Fletcher — the attorney Plaintiff had just fired on the record for the second time — continuing without the party whose case was being heard, represented by counsel whose authority to appear had been revoked.
- Civil lawsuit already pending — Dekleva, Buie named defendants for 74 days; criminal case proceeds in Buie's courtroom anyway
- Krause substituting for Crawford — no jurisdiction; neither judge has lawful authority over a county court criminal matter at this level
- Fletcher — backup counsel only, repeatedly fired — files two mental evaluation motions against a plaintiff he has never met outside a courtroom, after that plaintiff sues the presiding judges
- Oath refused on the record — Krause declines to produce a 1 Stat. 23-compliant oath on demand; the refusal is stated for the record
- Coercive threat from the bench — threatening a failure-to-appear finding to prevent Plaintiff from leaving a proceeding conducted by a judge whose lawful authority he had just challenged
- Proceeding with fired counsel in party's absence — hearing continues without the defendant, represented by an attorney whose authority had been revoked on the record
The hearing is on video.
Following the hearing, Plaintiff crossed the street to the Seminole County Sheriff's Office and requested Sheriff Dennis M. Lemma's oath of office. The records department produced an expired oath. When contacted again at a later date, the records department produced a second version — current and unexpired. Two versions of Lemma's oath exist in the record: the expired version produced on April 9, 2024, and a subsequent version whose date raises the question of whether it was prepared after the fact to fill the gap the first production revealed. The expired version is pending upload. Lemma Oath · Two Versions · Expired Version Pending Upload
→ Krause · Meet the Judges 📄 Lemma Oath — Current Version (Expired Version Pending Upload)
Second Judge Assigned — Chief Justice Muñiz Assigns Rebecca White
Chief Justice Muñiz assigns Judge Rebecca White to the circuit court civil case. Doc. 14 · 05/06/24 Buie, who had also been added as a defendant in the civil case, had similarly recused herself in the underlying criminal matter.
Judge White Recuses Sua Sponte — "Required" Under Florida Rule 2.330(i)
Judge Rebecca White recuses herself on the court's own initiative — not on motion from any party — under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(i), the rule governing mandatory sua sponte disqualification. Her order states:
White directs reassignment to Chief Judge Charles A. Schwab of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit. Notably, her order lists AAG Lydon William Schultz on the copies-to list — confirming the Florida Attorney General's office was already embedded in this civil case at the second-judge stage, months before the federal lawsuit was filed. State Doc. 15 · Filing # 199442200
Crawford Fails to Appear in Seminole County — Two Sworn Witnesses — No Minutes Ever Filed
A hearing in Case No. 2023-MM-001669A is scheduled before Judge Crawford in Courtroom 4C of the Criminal Justice Center in Sanford, Florida. Shad Douglas Pantle is present. The prosecutor is present. Case administrator Carsandra Buie is on the bench. Two sheriff's deputies are present. Crawford is not. The case is never called. After the full docket for that morning is cleared, Buie leaves the courtroom for several minutes, returns, and advises everyone that Crawford is not going to hear the case and it will be rescheduled. Everyone departs at approximately 12 PM.
Two independent witnesses — present in the courtroom from 9:25 AM to 12 PM — each executed sworn Affidavits of Witness under penalty of perjury documenting these facts. The affidavits are notarized by two different notaries in two different Florida counties. Buie and the two deputies present are also documented as not having the case on their courtroom schedule. The Seminole County Clerk of Court never filed the required minutes from this hearing. The official docket for Case No. 2023-MM-001669A contains no entry for the May 7, 2024 proceeding.
Daniel Michael Padilla — Orange County, Florida — sworn May 22, 2024 — Notary: Bonnie Weisinger (Commission #HH 293710)
Alexander Donald MacArthur — Seminole County, Florida — sworn June 8, 2024 — Notary: Harshad R. Patel (Commission #HH 449727)
At the time of the May 7 hearing, Carsandra Buie was a named defendant in Pantle v. Dekleva et al., Case No. 59-2024-CA-000138 — the civil lawsuit filed January 25, 2024, challenging the oath authority of the judges presiding over Plaintiff's criminal case, including Buie herself, for impersonating a judge. While that civil lawsuit was active and she was a named defendant, Buie continued hearing cases in her courtroom.
The Seminole County Clerk of Court scheduled Crawford's hearing in State v. Pantle — Case No. 2023-MM-001669A — in Buie's own Courtroom 4C. A judge who was an active defendant in a civil lawsuit brought by the plaintiff whose criminal case was simultaneously scheduled in her courtroom, administered by her, on the same morning. The Clerk arranged this. No recusal was filed for the May 7 proceeding. No minutes were filed either.
📄 Affidavits of Witness — Padilla & MacArthur (May–June 2024)
Crawford Holds Hearing in Brevard — Plaintiff in Seminole as Docket Showed — No Notice of Teams Format Change — Crawford Off the Record: "What a Cluster"
A pre-trial conference is scheduled on the Seminole County docket. Plaintiff appears at Courtroom 4C, Seminole County Criminal Justice Center — where the docket showed the hearing — with four witnesses, arriving at 9:25 AM. He remains until 12 PM. No deputy in Courtroom 4C attempts to call his name, identify him, or notify him of any change of location or format during this time.
Crawford is in fact in Brevard County, Courtroom 4B, holding the hearing as a Microsoft Teams video call. Kyle Fletcher is appearing by phone from out of state — his father had died. Crawford states on the record that notice was sent to Plaintiff's email and phone the day before. Plaintiff received no notice by any means — no email, no text, nothing in the mail. The only way Plaintiff knew about the hearing was by monitoring the docket himself.
During the hearing Crawford calls Seminole to ask whether anyone is in Courtroom 4C. He states on the record: "Seemingly Shad Pantle went to Courtroom 4C in Seminole at the direction of, um, Mr. Fletcher — not what we told him to do." Crawford also asks during the call: "Mr. Fletcher does not represent this fellow does he? Oh, I thought he was, that's right. (muffled — 'oath and the constitution')" — an on-record acknowledgment that Fletcher's representation is contested and that the oath and constitution are part of the case background. Seminole staff report back that Plaintiff was not found in the courtroom. Crawford: "The folks in 4 Charlie say he never showed."
What the video shows: Crawford is captured on video appearing to call over to Seminole — performing, on camera, the act of searching for Plaintiff. No deputy entered Courtroom 4C. No one called Plaintiff's name. No one conducted any search. Plaintiff and five witnesses sat in Courtroom 4C the entire time. The call Crawford made on video produced a report that Plaintiff "never showed" — from a staff member who never entered the courtroom where Plaintiff and five people were sitting. This is theater. The performance of a search, on camera, resulting in a warrant against a defendant who was present.
Crawford states on the record: "We're checking 4C in Seminole to see if he's there. The deputies are looking for him." Two notarized sworn witness affidavits — Padilla (Orange County) and MacArthur (Volusia County) — state that no deputy entered Courtroom 4C at any point during the 9:25 AM to 12 PM period. Crawford said deputies were looking. The witnesses swore no one came. That is a direct evidentiary conflict between Crawford's on-record statement and two independent notarized affidavits. Primary source confirmed on both sides.
Additional from transcript: Fletcher admitted in this hearing that he texted Pantle the night before directing him to Courtroom 4C at 9:30 AM — after all cease-and-desist demands. Crawford's position was that the hearing was Teams-only in Brevard. Fletcher didn't know that either: "I didn't understand that part... I did not know it was sent to his email, or the teams meeting, I did not know that." The notification chain was broken at every level. Crawford also stated on the record: "I have read all of the strange documents" — his characterization of Plaintiff's filings. Crawford further revealed he was conducting this hearing from Courtroom 4B in Viera, Brevard County — not Seminole County, where the case was docketed.
The additional irony: this is a private hearing conducted from Brevard County Courtroom 4B, Viera, Florida — Crawford in one county, Fletcher (the attorney Plaintiff had terminated seven times) appearing by phone from out of state due to a family emergency. Plaintiff, who was never notified of the Teams format, went to the correct Seminole County courtroom per the docket — directed there by Fletcher's own text the night before. Crawford held a private proceeding with a terminated attorney in another county, performed a search for the defendant on camera, was told the defendant wasn't found, and issued a no-bond warrant. Crawford himself failed to appear in person at any hearing in this case — the May 7 hearing at which Plaintiff was physically present for hours and Crawford never showed has two sworn witness affidavits and no Clerk's minutes. The judge who issued a failure to appear warrant had himself failed to appear.
Fletcher selected the June 14 date. At the end of the May 7 hearing, Crawford asked Fletcher to pick a date in June. Fletcher said: "How bout June 14th your honor?" Crawford confirmed it. The hearing at which Plaintiff and five witnesses sat undetected in Courtroom 4C while Crawford and Fletcher were on Teams — was scheduled by Fletcher himself.
Crawford continues the matter and sets it for June 14, 2024 — a date selected by Fletcher on the record: "How bout June 14th your honor?" Crawford ends the hearing: "Thank you. Bye bye. What a cluster. (garbled — 'that is') Alright, we're off the record again." These words are on the audio record of a judicial proceeding. The Seminole County Clerk files no minutes for this hearing. The only official record of what happened in Courtroom 4C is two independent notarized sworn affidavits from witnesses who were present.
Plaintiff went to the right location per the docket. No deputy entered or searched Courtroom 4C. No one called Plaintiff's name. No notice of the Teams format or location change was ever received by Plaintiff — he learned of the hearing only by monitoring the docket himself. The absence was recorded as a failure to appear — the predicate for the July 12 arrest warrant. Crawford's own words acknowledge Fletcher's contested representation status and that the oath and constitution are at issue. "What a cluster" is on the audio record of a court proceeding.
📄 Sworn Witness Affidavits — May 7, 2024 (Padilla & MacArthur)
Sealed Document Filed — 2 Pages — Marked Confidential — Contents Unknown to Public
Six days after the May 7 hearing at which no Clerk's minutes were filed, a sealed 2-page document is filed on the criminal docket (Docket #310, docket code LOPE). It is marked Confidential on the public docket. Its contents are not accessible to the public. It was filed between the May 7 no-minutes hearing and the June 7 Motion to Remand filing. Its existence is documented on the public docket. Its substance is not.
State Files Motion to Remand Into Custody + Notice of June 14 Hearing — Both Served to Fletcher Only — Not to Plaintiff
The State files two documents on the same day. First, a Motion to Remand Into Custody Until Competency Determination (Docket #311, Filing #200106607, e-filed 06/07/2024 at 3:45 PM) under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b)(3), asking the court to take Plaintiff into custody until his competency to proceed is determined. Second, a Notice of Hearing (Docket #312, Filing #200121968, e-filed 06/07/2024 at 6:26 PM) scheduling the remand motion for June 14, 2024 at 9:00 AM before Judge Charles Crawford.
Both certificates of service show service by email to Fletcher only — at [email protected]. Neither document was served directly on Plaintiff. Service went to the attorney Plaintiff had terminated by written notice in October 2023 (Docket #210) and again by formal letter on February 9, 2024 (Docket #282). Docket #311 · Docket #312 · 06/07/24
The Motion to Remand (Doc 311) rests on three grounds: (1) Dekleva's January 29 order requiring a competency evaluation before March 6; (2) Dekleva's January 30 order appointing Psychological Affiliates; and (3) that "per Attorney Fletcher" Plaintiff was notified by text message of two Psychological Affiliates appointments — February 22, 2024 and May 9, 2024 — and was a "No Show" on both occasions. The motion does not claim Plaintiff was directly notified by the court or the State Attorney. The entire notification chain runs through the attorney Plaintiff had terminated.
The February 22 "no show" is now documented by primary source: Chelsea Bennett, Psy.D. wrote to Judge DeKleva — who had recused from the case 22 days earlier on January 31 — reporting the missed appointment. The following day, February 23, Judge Carsandra Buie filed a Notice of Filing entering the Bennett letter into the criminal record, with copies served to the State Attorney and to Fletcher's email. Buie's signature appears on that Notice — the same judge who had been informed on the record that Fletcher was terminated. The Bennett letter addressed to a recused judge, filed by a judge who knew Fletcher had been terminated, based solely on a text Fletcher sent after his termination, became the foundation for a motion seeking Plaintiff's remand into custody four months later.
Attached to the motion as an exhibit is a letter dated May 9, 2024 from Chelsea Bennett, Psy.D. of Psychological Affiliates, Inc. — addressed to Judge James J. DeKleva, who had recused from this case on January 31, 2024, four months earlier. The letter confirms both no-shows and states: "per our office policy we are unable to offer any future evaluation attempts at this time." Doc 311, Page 10 of 10
📄 Doc 311 — Motion to Remand Into Custody 📄 Doc 312 — Notice of June 14 Hearing
Crawford Holds Hearing via Teams — Near-Empty Courtroom — Plaintiff Not Present — Fletcher Identified as Stand-By Counsel — No Action Taken
Motion hearing opens at 1:47 PM in Courtroom 4D. Plaintiff is not present — the minutes state: "DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRESENT FOR MOTION." Crawford is present via Microsoft Teams — confirmed explicitly in the official minutes. State Attorney Lynnette Paolucci is present. Fletcher appears as Stand-By Counsel — the minutes use that exact designation, the official record confirming he was never retained defense counsel. A video of this hearing exists showing Crawford appearing remotely while Seminole Courtroom 4D is near-empty. Docket #313 · 06/14/24
The court takes no action on the State's motion to remand Plaintiff into custody pending competency determination. Defendant is ordered to complete the previously ordered competency evaluation. Hearing re-scheduled to July 12, 2024 at 1:30 PM, Courtroom 1B. The June 14 date had been selected by Fletcher himself on May 7 — Crawford asked Fletcher to pick a date and Fletcher said "how bout June 14th your honor?" Crawford agreed. Docket #313 · 06/14/24
Plaintiff Files Amended Notice of Termination of All Agency Relationships and Revocation of Power of Attorney
Thirteen days after the June 14 Teams hearing and fifteen days before the July 12 warrant hearing, Plaintiff files an Amended Notice and Declaration of Termination of Agent or Agency Relationship and Revocation of Power of Attorney (Filing #201527320, e-filed 06/27/2024 at 6:33 PM). Notarized June 27, 2024 by Harshad R. Patel, Commission #HH449727. Certificate of service confirms delivery to the State Attorney's office in Seminole County. Docket #327 · 06/27/24
The document formally revokes and terminates all agent and agency relationships — whether created by the court or presumed by operation of law — between Shad Douglas Pantle as a living man and SHAD DOUGLAS PANTLE as a legal person/defendant. It rescinds all signatures and appearances in the case across all jurisdictions. It includes a Notice of Potential Liability attaching personal liability of $25,000,000 to any person who attempts to attach Plaintiff to the case as defendant, trustee, co-trustee, or surety. It includes a Notice of Subrogation to the Principal and explicitly cites 1 Stat. 23 as the basis for a potential claim.
This document is on the criminal docket between Crawford's June 14 Teams hearing and the July 12 hearing at which Crawford issues the failure to appear warrant and Chase signs it. Crawford and Chase had the docket. The notice was on it. Docket #327 · Filing #201527320 · 06/27/24
📄 Docket #327 — Amended Notice of Termination of Agency & Revocation of Power of Attorney
Failure to Appear Warrant Issued — Crawford by Video — Case Not Called — Chase Signs Warrant — Minutes Hidden as Confidential
Pre-trial conference at 1:30 PM, Courtroom 1B, Seminole County. Crawford appearing by video (Teams) from Brevard County. Kyle Fletcher appearing by video (Teams). Present in person: State Attorney Lynnette Paolucci; Ray Walker (observer); Jennifer Jones (court recorder). Plaintiff is not present. The case number is not called — a documented pattern across these Crawford hearings. Primary source: video recording in hand. Docket #330/141 · MNF · 07/12/24
The camera pans between an empty judge's chair and an empty room. Crawford is not in the chair — he is a rectangle on a television screen in the middle of the courtroom, not visible in this frame. Ray Walker watches from the gallery. The case number is not called. The Florida state seal is visible on the wall behind the unmanned bench. This is the hearing from which a no-bond failure-to-appear warrant was issued against the defendant — by a judge appearing as a television — in a room where the case was not called — documented on video.
Crawford mistakes Ray Walker (the observer) for Plaintiff, calls him to the podium, and threatens arrest before being told it is an observer. Crawford's exact words — now confirmed by transcript — directed at Ray Walker: "Mr. Pantle, I'm trying to have a conversation with you as to whether or not you need to be arrested and taken into custody today. I don't want to do that, but I'm about to if you don't approach and answer my question." Ray Walker tells the deputy he doesn't think "that gentleman" is there. The deputy confirms to Crawford it is an observer. Fletcher then identifies Walker by a nickname: "Is that the Englishman?" — confirming Fletcher recognized Walker from the June 14 hearing. Fletcher then states: "That's not Mr. Pantle your honor. Evidently Mr. Pantle is not here. Mr. Engish, the person there right now, was the observer last time."
Crawford then states: "Mr. Pantle apparently for the third time now is the subject of a failure to appear. So, I have no choice but to uh enter a failure to appear warrant, because I have no evidence that he has complied with the court's order to have a psychological evaluation or even present himself to court when asked to do so." Crawford arranges for Judge Chase to sign the warrant — Chase being a named defendant in the civil lawsuit filed January 25, 2024 and later named in the federal lawsuit (Pantle v. Crawford et al., 6:24-cv-01591). Crawford on the record: "Judge Chase, said she would be happy to sign it." Warrant is set at no bond. Crawford then makes an extraordinary personal notification request: "Can you put in the warrant that the Sheriff is to notify either me or Judge Chase immediately upon him being admitted to the jail please?" — requesting personal notification, by name, for himself and a named federal defendant, the moment Plaintiff is arrested.
Crawford's framing of the warrant: "help resolve his situation and maybe get him some help that he needs" — characterizing a no-bond arrest warrant as a mental health intervention. The Fletcher competency narrative, introduced by a terminated attorney via motions filed without consent, has now become Crawford's stated justification for the warrant at the July 12 hearing.
Crawford framed his warrant as predicated on a "third" failure to appear. Florida Statute § 843.15 contains no such threshold. A warrant may issue upon a single willful failure to appear — there is no two-strike or three-strike minimum in Florida misdemeanor FTA procedure. Crawford cited no statute because no such statute exists.
Of the FTAs Crawford counted: the June 14 absence was never properly noticed — Plaintiff was in the correct Seminole courtroom with five witnesses and no notice of the Teams format was ever received. The July 12 absence was the basis for this hearing itself. What Crawford may have counted as a prior FTA — the February 22 Psychological Affiliates no-show — was not a court hearing. It was a private evaluation appointment communicated solely through a terminated attorney via text after two written cease-and-desist demands. At most, Plaintiff had two disputed absences, neither of which was from a properly noticed court hearing. Crawford said "third." The count was wrong. The threshold was invented.
The warrant predicate is the May 7 absence — a hearing at which Plaintiff was in the correct Seminole courtroom but was not identified by anyone. Chase — a named civil and federal defendant without a 1 Stat. 23-compliant oath — signs the warrant at Crawford's request. Crawford is appearing from another county by video. The case number is not called. The hearing is on video with an observer present. The official minutes (Docket #330/141) are marked Confidential on the public docket — hidden from public view despite the hearing being recorded. Three Orlando Police Department officers are subsequently dispatched to execute the warrant at Plaintiff's home. No arrest is made. Body camera footage from all three officers is retained by Plaintiff. One phone call in the footage is blurred with audio excised.
Three OPD Officers Dispatched to Execute Chase's Warrant — No Arrest Made — Body Camera Footage Retained
Following the July 12 warrant signed by Chase, three armed Orlando Police Department officers are dispatched to Plaintiff's home. The officers do not effect an arrest. Plaintiff retains body camera footage from all three officers. No arrest was made. One phone call captured in the body camera footage has been blurred and the audio excised in the footage as produced — the redaction is documented.
The Coordinated Same-Day Actions — Documented by the Clerk's Own Records
On October 4, 2024, the Seminole County Clerk's electronic docket records three separate actions under a single filing number and timestamp: (1) Supreme Court of Florida Order of Termination, (2) Supreme Court Order assigning Isenhower, and (3) Isenhower's order dismissing the circuit court civil case. All three events are logged at 12:05:21 PM under Filing #208270148. This is the government's own electronic record. Fed. Doc. 36-1 · Exhibit A
Federal Lawsuit Filed — Crawford and Chase Named
Plaintiff files the original federal complaint in the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. Case No. 6:24-cv-01591-CEM is assigned to United States District Judge Carlos E. Mendoza and referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie Hoffman Price. Doc. 1 · Filed 08/30/24
Court Refers Case to IDEAL Program — Expedited Magistrate Track
Five days after filing, the court refers the case to the Inexpensive Determination, Efficient, and Abbreviated Litigation (IDEAL) Program — an expedited alternative track where parties consent to a magistrate judge conducting all proceedings including trial. Plaintiff received notice by mail on approximately September 7, 2024. The IDEAL Order contains consent forms which Plaintiff marks "RESPECTFULLY DECLINED" in red ink on every page and files back into the docket as ECF #8. Doc. 5 · Filed 09/04/24
The IDEAL referral and Plaintiff's documented refusal of consent become significant later: when Magistrate Price issues the R&R (Doc. 62) and Mendoza adopts it (Doc. 64), Plaintiff's Doc. 66 argues that the court's own docket shows consent was expressly withheld — twice — and that a magistrate judge therefore lacked jurisdiction to oversee any proceedings without that consent.
First Motion to Dismiss Denied — Defendants Failed to Follow Local Rules
The defendants' original Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14), filed October 4, 2024 by AAG Schwieterman, is denied without prejudice — not on the merits, but because defendants failed to comply with Local Rule 3.01(g)(3), which requires a pre-filing conferral with the opposing party. The order notes that if the opposing party is unavailable, the movant must diligently attempt contact for three days and then file a supplement. Schwieterman did neither. The first defense motion filed by a sitting AG's office against a pro se litigant failed on a conference requirement. Doc. 20 · Filed 10/21/24
Muñiz and Isenhower Added — Amended Complaint Filed
Following the October 4 coordinated actions — termination of Rebecca White's assignment, Isenhower's appointment, and same-day dismissal — Plaintiff files a 49-page First Amended Complaint adding Chief Justice Carlos G. Muñiz and Judge Daryl Isenhower as defendants alongside Crawford and Chase. The complaint attaches certified copies of all four defendants' oaths of office, alleges 14 causes of action including oath violations, impersonation, jurisdictional usurpation, and 14th Amendment violations, and demands declaratory judgment that all acts were void ab initio plus personal damages against each defendant individually. Doc. 25 · Filed 10/25/24
Defendants File Amended Motions to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds
Crawford and Chase file an Amended Motion to Dismiss asserting judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, now represented by AAG Juliana Tirado after Schwieterman's first motion failed. Doc. 32 · 11/08/24 Muñiz and Isenhower file a separate Motion to Dismiss on the same grounds. Doc. 35 · 11/15/24 All four defendants — including the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court and the judge who dismissed the civil case the same day he was appointed — are now represented by the Florida Office of the Attorney General. None of the AAGs representing them have filed their own oaths in the public record.
Mendoza Issues Show Cause Order — Plaintiff Directed to Explain Failure to Prosecute
Mendoza orders Plaintiff to show cause within 14 days why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute — no Case Management Report had been filed per the court's Initial Order and Local Rules. Plaintiff may cure by filing the report, thereby discharging the order. The order is entered the same day as Plaintiff's motion to extend time to respond to the motions to dismiss (Doc. 38). Doc. 37 · Filed 11/26/24
Mendoza Threatens Muñiz and Isenhower with Default — AG's Office Missed Mandatory Filings
Mendoza issues a show cause order directed at defendants Muñiz and Isenhower — not Plaintiff — ordering them to explain within seven days why they failed to file their Notice of Pendency of Related Actions and Disclosure Statement as required by the court's Initial Order and Local Rules. The order states that failure to comply may result in the entry of default. The Florida AG's office, representing two of the four judicial defendants, had missed the same mandatory initial filings that Plaintiff had been warned about. Muñiz and Isenhower comply the same day by filing the missing documents (Docs. 42, 43). Doc. 41 · Filed 12/04/24
Plaintiff Files Combined Opposition — De Facto Admission Documented
Plaintiff files a 20-page combined opposition to both motions to dismiss, attaching four annexes of documentary evidence. The response opens by documenting AAG Tirado's unilateral caption change in Doc. 35 — changing the case caption to misrepresent the capacity in which defendants are sued — and requests a judicial warning. The response documents that defendants' own state court motion to dismiss admitted to operating under the de facto doctrine, and argues that individuals operating in a de facto capacity without lawful authority cannot claim judicial immunity protections designed for lawfully commissioned officers. Plaintiff cites Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) directly. Doc. 49 · Filed 12/27/24
Magistrate Issues R&R — Recommends Dismissal on Immunity — Oath Argument Called "Frivolous" on Non-Binding Authority
Magistrate Judge Leslie Hoffman Price issues a 16-page Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal of the Amended Complaint in its entirety on judicial immunity grounds, without leave to amend. The R&R addresses the 1 Stat. 23 oath argument in two specific rulings — neither of which reaches the constitutional merits.
On damages (pages 12–13): The R&R finds Plaintiff "has not demonstrated that a private right of action exists" to raise the oath compliance claim, and calls the allegations "frivolous." For this proposition it cites Ramsell v. Wallace, No. CV-24-08161-PCT-DJH, 2024 WL 4007805 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2024) — a district court case from Arizona decided the same year, with no binding authority in the 11th Circuit. Ramsell itself cites only Carter v. Inslee, No. C16-1725-RSL-MAT (W.D. Wash. 2017) — another district court, in a different circuit. The R&R cites no 11th Circuit authority and no Supreme Court authority for the "no private right of action" holding.
On declaratory relief (page 13): The R&R finds Plaintiff "does not demonstrate how the oaths executed by Judges Crawford, Chase, Muñiz, and Isenhower... are somehow invalid" — despite the oaths being attached to the complaint. The R&R also states Plaintiff has not shown he "cannot make these arguments in his state court cases."
What the R&R does not do: It never analyzes whether the Art. II §5(b) form oath satisfies 1 Stat. 23's mandate. It never engages with the specific language of 1 Stat. 23. It never addresses the Supremacy Clause argument. The oath argument is labeled "frivolous" in a single paragraph citing only persuasive district court authority from outside the 11th Circuit. The constitutional question — whether Art. VI + 1 Stat. 23 compels a specific oath form and whether noncompliance voids authority — is not adjudicated. Doc. 62 · Filed 03/03/25
Response to R&R — Challenges Magistrate's Authority Under Federal Magistrates Act
Plaintiff files a Response to the R&R (Doc. 63), explicitly stating: "Shad Douglas Pantle will not address any points that Leslie Hoffman Price makes in her report to not give it any meaning, weight, life or credibility." Instead, the response challenges Magistrate Price's authority to participate in the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636 — the Federal Magistrates Act — citing the 11th Circuit's General Trading v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485 (11th Cir. 1997) and the Supreme Court's Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003). The response argues that because Plaintiff expressly withheld consent to magistrate participation — writing "RESPECTFULLY DECLINED" on the IDEAL consent forms and reflecting non-consent in the Case Management Report (Doc. 45) — Price lacked jurisdiction to oversee any proceedings. All her acts, including the R&R, are declared void.
This framing has a direct consequence. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), de novo review applies to specific portions of an R&R that a party objects to. By declining to object to the substance, Mendoza's dismissal order states: "Plaintiff does not object to the substance of the R&R. Indeed, Plaintiff expressly states that he 'will not address any points that [Judge] Hoffman Price makes in her report.' Therefore, the Court need not specifically address the analysis in the R&R." The oath argument, never addressed in the R&R on the merits, is adopted by default. Doc. 63 · Filed 03/14/25
Mendoza Dismisses — Exploits Doc. 63 — Oath Argument Never Reaches Merits
U.S. District Judge Carlos E. Mendoza adopts the Magistrate's R&R and grants both motions to dismiss. The order is three pages. Its substantive legal analysis is absent. Mendoza addresses Plaintiff's objection (Doc. 63) in one paragraph, noting that since Plaintiff "expressly states that he 'will not address any points' that Judge Hoffman Price makes... the Court need not specifically address the analysis in the R&R." He then overrules the objection on the magistrate authority question by citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) — which allows referral of dispositive motions to a magistrate for R&R without consent. The R&R is adopted in full. The case is dismissed without leave to amend on immunity grounds. The 1 Stat. 23 constitutional question is not addressed. Doc. 64 · Filed 08/29/25
Plaintiff Calls Out Mendoza Directly — "Lack of Testicular Fortitude to Support, Protect and Defend the Constitution"
Plaintiff files a 7-page Notice and Declaration of Void Order, arguing that Mendoza's dismissal order is itself void because (a) Magistrate Price lacked jurisdiction without Plaintiff's consent — documented twice in the docket, once through the written "RESPECTFULLY DECLINED" on the IDEAL forms and once through the Case Management Report (Doc. 45) — and (b) a void act by Price cannot be ratified by Mendoza under 28 U.S.C. § 636. The document invokes Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828), General Trading v. Yale Materials Handling Corp. (11th Cir. 1997), Roell v. Withrow (2003), and Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
The document also directly challenges Mendoza's constitutional accountability. Where Mendoza states that Plaintiff's non-objection to the R&R's substance means he "need not specifically address the analysis," Doc. 66 responds that Mendoza knew Plaintiff rejected the R&R in its entirety — and that his adoption of it anyway was not error but choice.
"Mendoza's adoption of Leslie Price's Report and Recommendation and dismissal of the case only shows lack of testicular fortitude to support, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, which Mendoza presumably took the oath to uphold."
The document also uses Muñiz's own words against the court. It quotes Muñiz — one of the defendants — as having written: "Most fundamental is the notion that the power of the people is superior to both the judiciary and the legislature. This requires judges to be grounded in the text of the Constitution and in our nation's history and traditions. No judicial decision is legitimate unless it can be justified by reference to those sources of authority." Mendoza's dismissal, the filing argues, fails that standard by its own author's measure. The 11th Circuit subsequently identifies Doc. 66 as a timely tolling motion under FRAP 4(a)(4)(A), Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1988), suspending all deadlines. Doc. 66 · Filed 09/04/25
Eleventh Circuit Issues Memorandum — All Appeal Deadlines Suspended
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issues a formal memorandum identifying Doc. 66 as a timely tolling motion, determining that the district court retains jurisdiction to dispose of it, and suspending all appeal deadlines pending the district court's ruling. The 11th Circuit cites FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) and Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1988). The appeal remains live and active. USCA11 Doc. 10 · 11/05/25
The docket for Case No. 2023-MM-001669A is sequentially numbered and runs to entry #346. Of those 346 numbered positions, 194 entries are publicly visible on the docket. The remaining 152 entries — 43.9% of the entire docket — are absent from the public record with no explanation.
The largest single gap — entries #167 through #186 (20 consecutive entries) — falls in the middle of October–November 2023, a period of active litigation. None of the 18 gap ranges carries any sealed-document notation on the public docket. Florida courts are required to list sealed entries with a confidentiality designation; these entries simply do not appear. This is consistent with the pattern of Clerk conduct documented elsewhere in this record: the refusal to issue the summons for Judge Buie, the absence of minutes for the May 7, 2024 hearing, and the truncated filing of the People's Writ of Quo Warranto with its first two pages removed.
The most recent visible entry — Docket #345 / Filing #143, dated August 20, 2024 — is designated LETT (Letter Response: Ex Parte — Please File, Not Read), 6 pages. This designation indicates a letter was filed but marked not to be read by the court — a procedural device that simultaneously creates a docket entry and withholds the document from judicial review. Docket entry #1 itself is absent — the very first entry in the case has no public record.
After the People's Writ of Quo Warranto was served on the Clerk of Court via USPS Certified Mail, the Seminole County Clerk filed the Writ on the criminal docket — but with the first two pages removed. The Writ was filed, not in its complete form, but as a truncated document missing its opening pages.
The question this raises is straightforward: why would a court officer remove the first two pages of a legal document before placing it on the public record? The first pages of the Writ establish its legal basis, its citation to 1 Stat. 23, and its demand for proof of lawful authority. Filing an incomplete version of the document — while omitting precisely the pages that frame the constitutional challenge — is not a clerical oversight. It is consistent with the broader pattern documented in this record: a public officer removing from the official record the portions of a document that are most legally significant.